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It is said that a country’s currency peg can become currency manipulation representing 
protracted government intervention in the foreign exchange market that gives it unfair 
competitive advantage in international trade yet prevents effective balance of payments in 
its trade partners. Regarding this widespread fallacy, this paper explains why currency 
peg is not currency manipulation even when it keeps a country’s currency undervalued. 
We clarify that 1) government is inherently a major player in the financial market and 
hence “no protracted intervention” is a meaningless guideline for designating currency 
manipulation; 2) exchange rate flexibility is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition 
for fixing current account imbalance and hence currency peg would not prevent effective 
current account adjustments; and 3) as far as causing “unfair” trade advantage is 
concerned, currency peg is less guilty than the attempt to prevent or fix current account 
imbalance; and obligating a country to adjust its currency to accommodate its trade 
partners’ current account management would unfairly impair this country’s trade 
advantage. (E52 F31 F32) 
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1.  Introduction 
Section 3004 of the United States Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (H.R. 
3) stipulates that “the Secretary of the Treasury shall analyze on an annual basis the 
exchange rate policies of foreign countries, in consultation with the International 
Monetary Fund, and consider whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between 
their currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of 
payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.”   
According to the Article IV of Agreement of International Monetary Fund (IMF), a 
country should “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system 
in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair 
competitive advantage over other members”. Specifically, IMF advises member countries 
to avoid “protracted, large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market” 
(Goldstein, 2004). Based on these IMF codes of conduct, the U.S. Treasury deems the 
authorities of an economy manipulating the exchange rate “if they intentionally act to set 
the exchange rate at levels, or ranges, to prevent effective balance of payments 
adjustments or gain unfair competitive advantage in international trade such that for a 
protracted period the exchange rate differs significantly from the rate that would have 
prevailed in the absence of action by the authorities.”
2 In sum, “no protracted 
intervention”, “no current account imbalance”, and “no unfair trade advantage” are three 
                                                        
2 See the Treasury’s “Report To The Committees On Appropriations on Clarification Of Statutory Provisions 
Addressing Currency Manipulation” for details.     2
major guidelines for designating currency manipulation.   
Entering the new millennium China has been accused of currency manipulation 
through pegging its currency (RMB) to the U.S. dollar (USD).
3  It is a common view that 
the RMB-USD peg has gained China unfair trade advantage yet caused large current 
account deficits and substantial manufacturing job losses in the United States.
4  
Notwithstanding considering China’s currency peg distortionary, the U.S. Treasury 
has not found China meeting the “technical requirements” for designating currency 
manipulation yet (Snow, 2005). However, the U.S. legislators appeared to be convinced 
that China’s currency peg is nothing but manipulation and have proposed legislations to 
either force China to stop it or protect the U.S. against it.
5  
In late July 2005, China revaluated its currency by 2% against the U.S. dollar and 
announced its intention to switch the RMB-USD peg to a trade-weighted currency basket 
peg. This “baby step” was welcomed by the U.S. policymakers but has not satisfied them 
                                                        
3 While China is the main target of the currency manipulation accusation, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Taiwan have also faced similar charges. For narrative convenience and clarity, we treat China as a 
representative currency manipulator; and our analysis applies to other alleged currency manipulators as well.   
4 For a few samples of this widespread view, see “Is China Playing by the Rules? Free Trade, Fair Trade, and WTO 
Compliance”, Hearing before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (September 24, 2003); “China’s 
Industrial, Investment and Exchange Rate Policies: Impact on the United States”, Hearing before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (September 25, 2003); “China’s Exchange Rate Regime and Its Effects on 
the U.S. Economy”, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and 
Technology of Committee on Financial Services (October 1, 2003); “The Report to the Congress on International 
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies”, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs (May 26, 2005); and “U.S.-China Economic Relations”, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 
(June 23, 2005). 
5  H.R. 3058 “Currency Harmonization Initiative through Neutralization Action Act of 2003” requires ”the Secretary of 
the Treasury to analyze and report on the exchange rate policies of the People's Republic of China, and to require that 
additional tariffs be imposed on products of that country on the basis of the rate of manipulation by that country of the 
rate of exchange between the currency of that country and the United States dollar.” The Schumer-Graham Bill 
introduced by Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) in 2005 threatens 27.5% countervailing 
tariffs against China’s currency “manipulation”.     3
yet.
6 Should there are no “larger steps in the future”, China will most likely face the 
manipulation accusation again.   
While currency peg has been a legitimate exchange rate regime for years,
7 China’s 
large foreign reserve accumulation since the end of last century fits the description of 
“protracted large-scale intervention in one direction”; and the concurrently growing U.S. 
current account deficit seems to be the consequence of this intervention preventing 
“effective balance of payment adjustments”.
8 Therefore, it seems obvious that China 
needs to adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime or at least substantially revaluate its 
currency; and failing to do so will be currency manipulation (Bergsten, 2004; Goldstein, 
2004, 2005).   
Not everyone agrees to the currency manipulation charge. Some authors claim that 
China’s overall current account surpluses are relatively small and hence do not indicate 
misaligned currency value; and its unusually large reserve accumulation is mainly caused 
by speculative capital inflows and its control over capital outflows (Yang and 
Bajeux-Besnainou, 2004). Some authors argue that China should not abandon its 
currency peg that has been crucial to the stability of both its own and the world economy 
                                                        
6 In the Senate Hearing on “The Federal Reserve’s Second Monetary Policy Report to Congress for 2005”, Senator 
Charles Schumer (D-NY), one of the sponsors of the Schumer-Graham Bill, had the following comments on China’s 
new exchange rate regime. "This is a good first step, albeit a baby step. It is smaller than we had hoped, but to 
paraphrase the Chinese philosophers, a trip of a thousand miles can well begin with the first baby step. The most 
significant thing about this move is that the Chinese in effect have conceded that pegging their currency is bad for 
China, for the world economy, and for the U.S., and we are glad they have come to that understanding. If there are not 
larger steps in the future, we will not have accomplished very much. But after years of inaction, this step is welcome."   
7 The IMF does not prohibit a member country from adopting a fixed exchange rate regime. Indeed, for nearly three 
decades after World War II major nations in the world have tried to maintain a global fixed exchange rate regime called 
the Bretton Woods system; and recently many European countries have moved one step further to adopt a unified 
currency called Euro. 
8 China’s foreign reserves have increased from 150 billion USD at the end of 1999 to 600 billion USD at the end of 
2004; and the U.S. current account deficit increased from 300 billion USD in 1999 to 670 billion USD in 2004.     4
(McKinnon, 2003a,b; Mundell, 2004); and some suggest that China should revaluate its 
currency and move towards a more flexible exchange rate regime for its own benefits but 
not because currency peg is illegal currency manipulation (Eichengreen, 2004; Frankel, 
2004; McCallum, 2004).   
However, supporting the currency manipulation accusation or not, most participants 
in the RMB debates agree that China’s persistent current account surpluses and 
substantial foreign reserve accumulation are evidence that the RMB has been 
undervalued. Then, why is a country artificially keeping its currency undervalued not 
manipulating it?   
We are aware of no direct answers to this question, which is nevertheless the most 
powerful argument supporting the currency manipulation charge. Suffice it to say that 
until this question is clarified, the U.S. policymakers will continue believing that 
countervailing tariffs against currency peg are not protectionism but a legitimate measure 
to “level the playing field” in international trade.   
This paper is to clarify why currency peg is not currency manipulation even when it 
keeps a country’s currency undervalued. In the next section we first disabuse a fallacy on 
government “intervention” in the foreign exchange market and explain why “protracted 
government intervention” is a meaningless indicator of currency manipulation. Then in 
section 3 we analytically show that exchange rate flexibility is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for fixing currency account imbalance, which clarifies that currency 
peg does not “prevent effective balance of payments adjustments”. Indeed, we argue that   5
currency peg tends to be helpful in fixing current account imbalance. In this section we 
also clarify that currency peg does not give a country unfair trade advantage; rather, 
obliging a country to revaluate its currency to help fix its trade partners’ current account 
imbalance is “current account manipulation” that could unfairly impair this country’s 
trade advantage. In section 4 we explore intellectual causes of such a widespread fallacy 
regarding currency manipulation. We conclude the paper in section 5.     
 
2.  Government “intervention” in the foreign exchange market: a clarification 
China’s large reserve accumulation since the new millennium unambiguously reflects the 
Chinese authorities’ “protracted, large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange 
market”, which undoubtedly has caused the exchange rate to differ “from the rate that 
would have prevailed in the absence of action by the authorities.” However, such 
“intervention” is not currency manipulation. Indeed, the whole idea of government 
“intervening” in the foreign exchange market is a fallacy we intend to clarify in the 
following.  
According to the basic welfare theorem, prices determined by free market mechanism 
are efficient, while those under the influence of government tend to be distorted. Based 
on this free market doctrine, no currency manipulation is to let the market determine 
currency value.   
However, while government can or should generally leave the goods market to the 
“invisible hand”, it has to be a major player in the financial market. Indeed, a major task   6
of the Federal Reserve in the United States is to influence the Fed Funds Rate through 
open market operations in the treasury securities market.     
If systematically intervening in the determination of interest rate (as a price between 
the same currency at two different times) is legitimate, why is intervention in the 
determination of exchange rate (as a price between two different kinds of currencies) 
“manipulation”? If the Federal Reserve has liberty to accumulate treasury securities for 
maintaining its interest rate target, what is wrong with the People’s Bank of China doing 
the same thing for maintaining its exchange rate target?   
 
Remark 2.1 In the modern economy based on fiat money, the belief that there exists a 
purely market-based exchange rate free from government intervention is an illusion. 
Government, as the ultimate supplier of money, would affect the exchange rate, directly 
or indirectly. 
 
Indeed, in the recent RMB controversies, a case can be made that it is the United States 
who has been “manipulating” its currency. Although the U.S. has not directly intervened 
in the foreign exchange market, the interest rate cuts initiated by the Federal Reserves 
since 2000, which reduced the Fed Funds Rate from above 6% in 2000 to only 1% at the 
end of 2003, are effectively a “protracted, large scale intervention in one direction” that 
puts depreciating pressure on the dollar. Consequently, the cheap U.S. money flowing 
into China for higher returns becomes the foreign reserves of the Chinese government   7
who has been the trustee of the country’s foreign assets. What such large reserve 
accumulation reflects is no more China’s currency “manipulation” for preventing RMB 
appreciation than the U.S. “manipulation” to facilitate USD depreciation.   
As pointed out by McCallum (2004), “exchange rate policy and monetary policy are 
not two independent entities”; and “in an economy without direct controls on foreign 
transactions, the two amount to virtually the same thing”. The U.S. policymakers do not 
always agree to the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, yet they have not suggested that 
the Fed should let the market determine the interest rate. Likewise, governments’ 
exchange rate policies are not always appropriate, yet “no intervention” is not the 
solution. 
 
Remark 2.2 “No protracted intervention” is a pointless guideline for designating 
currency manipulation. When the exchange rate is right, government’s effort to maintain 
it, however protracted, is not currency manipulation. When the exchange rate is wrong, 
government’s inaction would nevertheless be manipulation. 
 
3.    Exchange rate and current account: a general equilibrium analysis 
In general, the currency of a country with persistent current account surpluses (or deficits) 
is considered undervalued (or overvalued).
9 Based on this notion, China’s currency peg 
                                                        
9  While the U.S. policymakers are mainly concerned about the impact of China’s currency manipulation on its current 
account, balance of payments, which includes both current and capital (or financial) account, is another often-used 
indicator of exchange rate misalignment (Goldstein, 2004). However, our clarification in the last section implies that   8
is deemed inappropriate because it seems to keep RMB at an undervalued level that 
sustains its current account surpluses yet causes excessive deficits in the United States.     
However, an under-appreciated point is that correcting exchange rate misalignments 
does not necessarily entail exchange rate adjustments. Since by definition exchange rate 
is misaligned when current account is imbalanced, fixing the imbalance would 
automatically correct the misalignment. The key is whether fixing current account 
imbalance must require adjusting the exchange rate; in other words, whether exchange 
rate flexibility is a necessary condition for current account adjustments.   
Indeed, whether exchange rate flexibility is a sufficient condition for fixing current 
account imbalance is also questionable. It is true that other things being equal, currency 
depreciation tends to improve a country’s current account through reducing its terms of 
trade. However, other things can hardly remain equal when the exchange rate is changed; 
e.g., dollar depreciation would tend to generate inflation pressure that forces the Federal 
Reserve to raise the interest rate. Therefore, a general equilibrium perspective is needed 
to examine whether exchange rate is an effective instrument for fixing current account 
imbalance.  
Although exchange rate adjustments may be neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for fixing current account imbalance, they could be helpful in that respect. 
Indeed, exchange rate seems to be the most favorite tool for fixing current account 
                                                                                                                                                                     
capital account (or financial account) imbalance is not an appropriate indicator of exchange rate misalignment—more 
discussion on this point can be found in section 4.     9
imbalance. Its legitimacy has been taken for granted to such an extent that when there 
exists current account imbalance, fixed exchange rate becomes currency manipulation for 
unfair trade advantage. This popular view is nevertheless a fallacy. 
In the following we will use a general equilibrium model to show that 1) exchange 
rate alone is not an effective instrument for fixing current account imbalance; i.e., 
exchange rate flexibility is not a sufficient condition for current account adjustments; 2) 
neither is exchange rate flexibility a necessary condition for current account adjustments; 
and 3) fixed exchange rate does not provide unfair trade advantage; rather, obligating a 
surplus country to revaluate its currency could unfairly impair its trade advantage.   
 
3.1  The  model 
Similar to many works on the RMB controversies (e.g., Frankel, 2004), we use the 
Mundell-Fleming framework to model the determination of exchange rate and current 
account. We use a two-country model, which allows us to examine the issue from a 
global perspective that considers not only the home country’s policy targets but also those 
of the foreign country. It should be noted that since trade balance is the dominant 
component of current account and the focus of the RMB controversies, in this model we 
consider only trade balance instead of the entire current account that also includes other 
payments and receipts.   
The model contains two countries and four goods.  x Q1  and  n Q1  are tradable and   10
non-tradable goods produced in country 1, while  m Q2  and  n Q2  are their respective 
counterparts in country 2. Note that country 1 and 2 represent the United States and those 
accused currency manipulators in the context of the RMB controversies.     
For simplicity, assume labor (L) is the only input in the production  functions:   
ij ij ij L Q α = , (1) 
where the parameter  0 > α   measures labor productivity; and the subscripts  2 , 1 = i  and 
n m x j , , =   identify countries and goods respectively. 
Suppose labor income absorbs the entire production revenue,
10  i.e.,  
ij ij ij i Q P L W = ,   (2) 
where  ij P  is the price of good j in country i (in terms of its currency); and  i W  is the 
wage rate in country i, which is identical in the tradable and non-tradable sectors.   
Suppose consumption is Cobb-Douglas in both countries; then the value of country i’s 
consumption of good j is a fixed proportion of its total consumption, i.e.,   
) , ( i i i ij ij ij s i Y C P θ = ,   (3) 
where  ij C  represents country i’s consumption of good j;  i Y  denotes country i’s 
aggregate demand that is a function of the interest rate (as a monetary policy instrument) 
and subject to the exogenous demand shock  i s  ( 0 / < ∂ i i i Y  and  0 ˆ / > ∂ i i s Y ); and  ij θ  
is a parameter measuring country i’s consumption preference over good j (∑ =
j
ij 1 θ  
meaning that country i’s aggregate demand is equal to its total consumption 
                                                        
10  It would make no intrinsic difference to assume that the labor income is less than 100 percent yet a constant share of 
the production revenue.   11
expenditure).
11 
The goods market equilibrium conditions are   
n n Q C 1 1 =    (4) 
x x x Q C C 1 2 1 = +    (5) 
n n Q C 2 2 =    (6) 
m m m Q C C 2 2 1 = +    (7) 
x x eP P 1 2 =    (8) 
m m eP P 1 2 =    (9) 
1 1 1 L L L n x = +    (10) 
2 2 2 L L L n m = +    (11) 
2 1 1 ) / 1 )( 1 ( i e e i + = + + &    (12) 
Equations (4) and (5) are the market clearing conditions for the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors in country 1; and equation (6) and (7) are the similar conditions in country 2. 
Equations (8) and (9) are the law of one price for the two tradable goods Qx and Qm, 
where e denotes the exchange rate.
12  Equation (10) and (11) are the labor market clearing 
conditions in the two countries. Equation (12) represents the interest parity under free 
capital mobility. 
Regarding the internal balance, suppose the two countries target their domestic 
inflation rates defined respectively by     
                                                        
11  The sum of  s ' θ   would be less than 1 if the investment component of aggregate demand is considered. Since that 
would not gain us extra insights, we do not consider the investment component for simplicity.   
12 Suppose country 1 and 2 are the United States and China respectively, then e = 8.3 yuan/dollar under China’s 
currency peg.     12
1 ) )( (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − + + + + ≡
−
n n m m x x n n m m x x C P C P C P C P C P C P π  (13) 
and 
1 ) )( (
1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 − + + + + ≡
−
n n m m x x n n m m x x C P C P C P C P C P C P π  (14) 
where  i π  is the inflation rate in country i; and  ij P  are the benchmark base price of 
good j in country i. According to this definition, country i would have zero inflation if the 
value of its total consumption under the current prices ( ij P ) is the same as it would be 
under the base prices ( ij P ). 
The last equation in the model defines country 1’s current account balance as 
m m x x C P C P CA 1 1 2 1 − ≡ .   (15) 
In Appendix A.1 and A.2 we present more details of this model and show that it can be 
reduced to the following 6 equations. 
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Equation (16), derived from equations (1)-(11), is a necessary condition for goods and 
labor market equilibrium in country 1; equation (17) represents the corresponding   13
condition for country 2. Equation (18), derived based on equation (13), represents a 
necessary condition for country 1 to achieve its inflation target  1 π  as the goal of its 
internal balance; and equation (19) is a necessary condition for country 2 to achieve  2 π . 
Equation (20), identical to equation (12), represents the interest parity under free capital 
mobility, which implies identical interest rates in the two countries (i.e.  2 1 i i = ) when the 
exchange rate is in equilibrium (i.e.,  0 = e & ). Equation (21), derived based on equation 
(15), provides a macroeconomic perspective of current account determination.   
These 6 equations simultaneously determine the equilibrium of the world economy; 
based on which we first examine whether flexible exchange rate is a sufficient condition 
for country 1 to use exchange rate as an instrument to fix its current account imbalance.   
Solving our deceptively simple model turns out to be extremely tedious in algebra. 
For clarity we place most of the mathematical details in the appendix and focus on 
discussing intuitions behind the results in the text. 
 
3.2    Flexible exchange rate as an instrument for current account adjustments 
According to equation (21),   
0 /
2
2 2 < − = ∂ ∂
− e Y e CA x θ , 
which implies that given the aggregate demands Y1 and Y2, country 1 can improve its 
current account through currency depreciation (i.e., a decrease in e).
13 However, since 
                                                        
13 Intuitively, given country 2’s aggregate demand and hence its expenditure on imported goods, country 1’s currency 
depreciation would increase the value of its export (in terms of its own currency) to country 2 and hence improve its 
current  account.     14
the exchange rate e appears in all the 6 equations from (16) to (21), its change is unlikely 
to have no impacts on Y1 and Y2. Therefore, a general equilibrium perspective is needed 
to examine whether exchange rate is an effective instrument for fixing current account 
imbalance.  
Suppose initially the world economy is in an equilibrium described by   







* CA e i i π π ≡ Γ ,  
i.e., under the interest rates 
*
1 i  and 
*
2 i , both countries achieve their inflation targets  1 π  
and  2 π , with the corresponding equilibrium exchange rate at 
* e  and current account at 




1 i i =  since the expected exchange rate movement is equal to zero at 
equilibrium (i.e.,  0
* = e & ).  
Then, suppose a positive aggregate demand shock occurs in country 1 (i.e., 
0 1 > ds ) and shifts the world economy to a new situation described by   
} ˆ , ˆ , , ; ˆ , ˆ { ˆ





1 2 1 ˆ ˆ i i i i = > =  ( i.e., a higher world interest rate), 
* ˆ e e > (an appreciation in 
country 1’s currency), and 
* ˆ CA A C <  ( i.e., a deterioration of country 1’s current 
account).
14  
Intuitively, the positive demand shock generates inflation pressure that forces country 
1’s government to raise  1 i , which will induce the appreciation of country 1’s currency. 
The inflation pressure as well as the interest rate hike in country 1 will be transmitted to 
                                                        
14 We assume that both country 1 and 2’s consumption of imported goods is relatively small compared to their 
domestic consumption, which is not unrealistic. Under this assumption, we show in Appendix that, a positive demand 
shock in country 1 would drive up the interest rate (see inequality A.50 in Appendix A.3.2), appreciate its currency (see 
inequality A.68 in Appendix A.3.5), and deteriorate its current account (see inequality A.57 in Appendix A.3.2).   15
country 2 through the goods and asset markets, and force country 2’s government to raise 
2 i . The resulting decrease in country 2’s aggregate demand helps accommodate country 
1’s expanding demand, which explains the current account deterioration.   
In the situation of  Γ ˆ , suppose country 1’s government is uncomfortable with its 
current account balance  A Cˆ  and wishes to improve it back to 
* CA . Will currency 
depreciation be an effective instrument to achieve this goal? The answer is negative. 
Suppose country 1 is able to depreciate its currency from e ˆ  to  e ~ . As this 
depreciation generates inflation pressure in country 1 by increasing its import price, 
country 1’s monetary authorities will have to increase the interest rate i1. According to 
equation (21), both the currency depreciation (i.e., a lowered e) and the interest rate hike 
(i.e., a higher i1) would help improve country 1’s current account. The impact of country 
1’s policy is not limited to itself. Both the decreases in e and Y1 will generate deflation 
pressure in country 2 and force it to cut the interest rate i2. This interest rate cut would 
stimulate country 2’s aggregate demand Y2, which according to equation (21) also helps 
improve country 1’s current account. Therefore, currency depreciation from e ˆ  to 
e ~ seems to be able to move the world economy from  Γ ˆ  to  
} , ~ , , ; ~ , ~ { ~ *
2 1 2 1 CA e i i π π = Γ   
under which country 1 achieves the goal of increasing its current account from  A Cˆ  back 
to 
* CA . 
Unfortunately, this desirable situation of Γ ~  is not in equilibrium. As discussed 
above, the exchange rate decline from e ˆ  to  e ~  will cause an interest disparity   16
(i.e., 2 1
~ ~ i i > ) by driving up country 1’s interest rate yet pushing down country 2’s. This 
disparity will generate appreciating pressure to push the exchange rate back to the level 
of  e ˆ and foil country 1’s attempt to fixed current account imbalance through currency 
depreciation.  
Country 1 should not blame country 2 for cutting its interest rate to hinder the 
currency depreciation crucial for fixing its current account imbalance; the latter merely 
tries to maintain its internal balance. Indeed, country 1’s own interest rate hike for its own 
internal balance is also a force against the depreciation. The key is that flexible exchange 
rate is an endogenous variable not supposed to be an effective instrument to influence 
current account.   
 
Remark 3.1 The exchange rate is not an effective instrument for fixing current account 
imbalance because monetary policies used by countries to maintain their internal 
balance have already indirectly determined it.   
 
This should not be surprising; it reflects the spirit of the well-known “incompatible 
trinity”. That is, free capital mobility does not allow a country to independently target 
both its inflation rate and the exchange rate through monetary policy. Here from a global 
perspective, two instruments (i.e., country 1 and 2’s interest rates i1 and i2) are not enough 
to achieve three independent targets (i.e., their domestic inflation rates 1 π  and  2 π  and 
the exchange rate e). Therefore,     17
 
Remark 3.2 To the disappointment of those who count on currency depreciation to fix 
current account imbalance, flexible exchange rate is not a sufficient condition for current 
account adjustments.   
  
3.3    Fixed exchange rate as a hindrance to current account adjustments 
The impotence of flexible exchange rate in fixing current account imbalance has not 
acquitted currency peg of the manipulation charge yet, since fixing current account 
imbalance could be a mission impossible without exchange rate flexibility. However, is 
flexible exchange rate a necessary condition for current account adjustments? 
To answer this question, we examine whether and how country 1 can fix its current 
account imbalance under flexible exchange rate and currency peg respectively.       
 
Current account management under flexible exchange rate 
Recall that under flexible exchange rate, a positive demand shock in country 1 can shift 
the world economy from 
* Γ  to Γ ˆ , causing country 1’s current account to deteriorate 
from 
* CA  to  A Cˆ . Therefore, conversely when the world economy is in the situation of 
Γ ˆ , country 1’s government can initiate a negative demand shock through fiscal tightening 
to shift the world economy from  Γ ˆ  to 
* Γ  and hence improve its current account from 
A Cˆ  to 
* CA .  
Intuitively, as the fiscal tightening reduces its aggregate demand, country 1’s   18
monetary authorities have to cut the interest rate to maintain its internal balance. The 
resulting interest disparity will cause country 1’s currency to depreciate.
15 As the 
depreciation makes country 1’s production cheaper yet country 2’s more expensive, the 
world demand on country 2’s production will shrink. Consequently, country 2 will cut its 
interest rate to generate more demand on domestic goods, which at the same time also 
induces more demand on country 1’s exports. Eventually, the country 1’s fiscal tightening 
can shift the world economy from Γ ˆ  to 
* Γ  with an increase in country 1’s current 
account (i.e.,  A C CA ˆ * > ), a decline in the world interest rate ( i i ˆ * < ), and a depreciation 
in country 1’s currency ( e e ˆ
* < ). In sum, 
 
Remark 3.3 Under flexible exchange rate, fiscal tightening is an effective instrument for 
fixing current account imbalance, which tends to be accompanied by currency 
depreciation. 
 
Although fixing current account imbalance through fiscal tightening tends to cause 
currency depreciation, it could be misleading to credit the depreciation as the “cause” of 
the adjustment. Indeed, currency depreciation is merely one of the many factors (e.g. 
decline in the interest rates as another) that facilitate current account improvement driven 
by fiscal tightening.   
                                                        
15 Since country 1’s fiscal tightening will reduce its import demand, country 2 may also react with interest rate cuts, 
which nevertheless tend to be relatively small.     19
However, what if country 2 adopts a fixed exchange rate regime? Will fiscal 
tightening still be able to fix country 1’s current account imbalance under country 2’s 
currency peg?   
 
Current account management under currency peg   
In the situation of  Γ ˆ , suppose country 1 attempts to use fiscal tightening to improve its 
current account from  A Cˆ  to 
* CA , while country 2 commits to keeping the exchange 
rate fixed at  e ˆ and hence loses its monetary independence. Thus, in the simultaneous 
system (16)-(21), the exchange rate becomes exogenous, while country 2’s inflation rate 
2 π   is endogenized. Under this situation, we show in Appendix A.4.1 (see equations A.77 














which indicates that under the fixed exchange rate, fiscal tightening (i.e.  0 1 < ds ) can 
still help country 1 to fix its current account imbalance (i.e.  0 > dCA ), but would cause 
higher inflation in country 2 (i.e.,  0 2 > π d ) who prioritizes its exchange rate stability 
over inflation stability. 
 
Remark 3.4 Currency peg does not hinder current account adjustments. Currency peg   20
fixes only the nominal exchange rate, while current account adjustments depend on the 
terms of trade that can be adjusted through price variations in the goods markets.      
 
The situation becomes more complicated if country 2 wishes to target both its inflation 
rate and the exchange rate. Two targets take two instruments. While country 2 loses its 
monetary independence because of the currency peg, fiscal policy can help it keep 








which indicates that fiscal tightening in country 1 will not be able to help it fix its current 
account imbalance when country 2 targets both its inflation rate and the exchange rate.   
Intuitively, when country 2 sacrifices its monetary independence for currency peg, 
fiscal tightening allows country 1 to adopt expansionary monetary policy to stimulate the 
aggregate demand in country 2, which is the key mechanism for fixing its current account 
imbalance. However, this mechanism breaks down when country 2 uses fiscal policy to 
influence its domestic demand.   
However, even under this situation, fixing current account imbalance is still not 
impossible: Country 1 has an option to sacrifice its inflation target for its goal of external 
balance. When country 1 quits targeting inflation for current account management, the 
interest rate i1 becomes exogenous while its inflation rate  1 π  is endogenized in the   21
simultaneous system (16)-(21). Thus, country 1 can use the interest rate to influence the 














which indicates that monetary tightening can help country 1 fix current account 
imbalance but would lead to below-target inflation.   
Intuitively, under currency peg, monetary tightening in country 1 (i.e.,  0 1 > di ) will 
induce similar tightening in country 2, which will have negative impacts on both 
countries’ aggregate demands. However, while country 2 will use fiscal expansion to 
counteract this impact to maintain its inflation target, country 1 can choose not to do so 
and hence improve its current account (i.e.,  0 > dCA ). 
In sum, as long as country 1 adopts appropriate policies, country 2’s currency peg 
would not prevent it from fixing its current account imbalance. Therefore,   
 
Remark 3.5 Exchange rate flexibility is not a necessary condition for current account 
adjustments.  
 
Indeed, currency peg can actually facilitate current account adjustments. As discussed 
above, inducing aggregate demand expansion in country 2 is the key to reducing country   22
1’s current account deficits. Under flexible exchange rate, since country 2’s monetary 
authorities do not “intervene” in the foreign exchange market, the transmission 
mechanism is mainly through the goods market: Currency depreciation puts deflation 
pressure in country 2’s goods market and forces country 2 to cut its interest rate to 
stimulate the aggregate demand. One problem of this mechanism is that the exchange rate 
may not affect the terms of trade effectively because of low exchange rate passthrough; 
and another problem is that price adjustments in the goods market tend to be slow.   
In contrast, the transmission mechanism under fixed exchange rate would be more 
straightforward: When fiscal tightening forces country 1 to cut its interest rate to fight the 
resulting deflation pressure, country 2 has to cut its as well in order to maintain the 
interest parity that it has to respect under the currency peg.   
Since this transition mechanism through the asset market tends to work more 
effectively and swiftly than the one through the goods market, country 1 would find a 
country 2 with currency peg more supportive to its effort in fixing current account than 
one without. 
Theoretically, country 1 may have to sacrifice its inflation stability for fixing its 
current account imbalance when country 2 uses both monetary and fiscal policies to 
target both its inflation rate and the exchange rate. Yet in reality the chance for country 1 
to be in this situation tends to be slim because from country 2’s point of view, fighting 
inflation pressure from abroad with exchange rate adjustments tends to be more 
convenient than resorting to fiscal tightening. Indeed, one major rationale for China to   23
increase the flexibility of its exchange rate is to shelter it from foreign shocks (Frankel, 
2004).  
 
3.4    Currency manipulation versus current account manipulation 
Our foregoing analysis has cleared the charge that a country’s currency peg that keeps its 
currency undervalued is currency manipulation because it prevents effective current 
account adjustments in its trade partners. In the following we will examine another 
charge against currency peg. That is, currency peg that keeps a country’s currency 
undervalued gives it “unfair” competitive advantage in international trade. We are aware 
of no serious examination of this popular assertion; observers either take it for granted or 
simply dismiss it. However, its validity is crucial: Were it true, countervailing measures 
against currency peg would be justified; otherwise, they are disguised protectionism.   
 
A measure of competitive advantage in international trade 







1 ≡ . (22) 
The greater the TOT is, the cheaper and hence the more competitive is the country 2’s 
tradable goods ( m Q2 ); and the more expensive and hence the less competitive is country 
1’s tradable goods ( x Q1 ).   
According to equation (22), it seems obvious that currency peg provides unfair trade   24
advantage when it keeps a country’s currency undervalued: When country 2’s currency is 
pegged at an undervalued level, the exchange rate e would be higher than what it should 
have been under flexible exchange rate, which will inflate the TOT and hence “unfairly” 
increase country 2’s trade advantage. However, this plausible argument neglects the 
impact of country 2’s currency peg on its domestic price level. As mentioned in Remark 
3.4, currency peg only fixes the nominal exchange rate, while the terms of trade can be 
adjusted via price variations in the goods markets.   
To examine how currency peg affects the terms of trade, we assume a positive 
productivity shock occurring in country 2’s tradable sector (i.e., 0 2 > m dα ) and compare 
how the terms of trade would respond to this shock in three scenarios 
 
No manipulations: a benchmark scenario 











which indicates that given the wage rates in country 1 and 2, country 2’s productivity 
hike in the tradable sector (i.e.,  0 2 > m dα ) will increase its trade advantage through 
raising country 1’s terms of trade (i.e.,  0 > dTOT ). This is not surprising; a country’s 
productivity hike in its tradable sector is supposed to be one of the most legitimate 
sources of its competitive advantage in international trade. However, since the 
productivity hike tends to affect the wage rates through the Balassa-Samuelson effect,   25
this partial equilibrium result is merely illustrative; a general equilibrium analysis is 
needed.  
We first consider a benchmark scenario under which both countries use monetary 
policy to target their domestic inflations only and do not directly intervene in the 
determination of the exchange rate or the current account. Based on the simultaneous 
system (16)-(21), we show in Appendix A.3.1 (equation A.46) that under this benchmark 
situation 
m
BM d dTOT 2 1 α Φ = ,   (23) 
where  0 > Φi  are summarizing notations whose expressions are given in the appendix. 
We also show in Appendix A.3.3 (equation A.58) that it is possible that   
m d dCA 2 2 α Φ − = , (24) 
and in Appendix A.3.4 (equation A.63) that it is possible that 
m d de 2 3 α Φ − = .   (25) 
These results indicate that without foreign exchange or current account intervention, a 
positive productivity shock in country 2’s tradable sector ( 0 2 > m dα ) would increase its 
trade advantage by increasing country 1’s terms of trade (i.e.  0 > dTOT ), and could 
depreciate country 1’s currency ( 0 < de ) and worsen its current account ( 0 < dCA ).
16 We 
                                                        
16  Intuitively, the productivity increase in country 2’s tradable sector would increase the supply capacity of its tradable 
goods relative to country 1’s tradable goods, which explains its positive impact on country 1’s terms of trade. 
According to equation (22), the adjustment in the terms of trade can be accomplished by a decline in the price of 
country 2’s tradable goods (i.e., m P2 ) and/or an increase in the price of country 1’s tradable goods (i.e., x P 1 ). However, 
since both countries target their inflation rates, the term of trade adjustment tends to also entail a change in the nominal 
exchange rate. The extra supply due to the productivity hike in country 2 tends to cause a decline in the world interest 
rate to generate more aggregate demands in both countries to accommodate this supply increase. Since the extra supply 
belongs to country 2 only, the increase in country 1’s aggregate demand tends to increases its current account deficit.     26
take this case as the benchmark scenario to examine how currency peg affects 
competitive advantage in international trade in the next scenario and how current account 
management affects trade advantage in the third scenario.   
 
Currency manipulation and trade advantage 
In the second scenario we consider a situation where country 1 uses its monetary policy 
to target its domestic inflation, while country 2 uses its to target the exchange rate. 
When the exchange rate is fixed (i.e.,  0 = de ), country 2’s tradable productivity hike 
would not be able to reduce the exchange rate e as it would under the flexible exchange 
rate. However, as a result, country 2’s price level will be higher. While the former will 
further increase country 2’s trade advantage, the latter represents an opposite force. Our 
initial conjecture was that these two forces would offset each other so that the impact of 
the productivity shock on the terms of trade would be the same with or without the 
currency peg. It turns out that this conjecture is inaccurate.   
In Appendix A.5 we show that when country 2 sacrifices its monetary independence 
for targeting the exchange rate (i.e., in the simultaneous system (16)-(21), e becomes 
exogenous while  2 π   becomes endogenous), a productivity shock in country 2’s tradable 
sector will have the following impact on country 1’s terms of trade: 
de d dTOT m 5 2 4 Φ + Φ = α . (26) 
Recall that equation (25) measures how the exchange rate would have changed by the 
productivity shock under the no-manipulation benchmark situation. Thus, substituting it   27
into equation (26), we obtain the benchmark impact of the productivity hike on the terms 
of trade under the situation with neither exchange rate nor current account intervention: 
m
BM d dTOT 2 5 3 4 ) ( α Φ Φ − Φ = . (27) 
According to equation (26), when country 1 pegs its currency (i.e.,  0 = de ), the 
terms-of-trade impact would be 
m
EX d dTOT 2 4 α Φ = . (28) 
A comparison between equations (27) and (28) indicates that   
BM EX dTOT dTOT > ; (29) 
i.e., country 2’s productivity shock would have a greater impact on country 1’s terms of 
trade under the fixed exchange rate than in the no-manipulation benchmark scenario. 
Therefore, 
 
Remark 3.6 A country’s positive productivity shock in its tradable sector can increase its 
competitive advantage in international trade by a greater extent under currency peg than 
under flexible exchange rate.   
 
Such extra trade advantage is due to a wealth effect. The productivity shock in country 2 
represents a deflationary force that will reduce the world interest rate so as to stimulate 
the aggregate demands in both countries. Each country’s contribution to fighting this 
deflation pressure mainly depends on the interest elasticity of its aggregate demand. 
However, whether price adjustments in international trade are accomplished directly   28
through price variations in goods markets or indirectly via exchange rate adjustments also 
matters. Since the higher domestic price level in country 2 under the currency peg will 
cause a wealth effect that negatively affects its aggregate demand, its aggregate demand 
expansion would be smaller under the currency peg than when the exchange rate is 
flexible; and that of country 1 would be greater. Since own goods tend to dominate 
foreign goods in both countries’ consumption portfolios, country 2’s domestic prices will 
be lower under the currency peg than the flexible exchange rate; and those of country 1 
would be higher. This explains why country 1 would have a higher terms of trade when 
country 2 pegs its currency.   
 
Current account manipulation and trade advantage 
According to equation (24), even when country 2 does not peg its currency, the 
productivity hike in country 2’s tradable sector would still cause current account 
imbalance in country 1. Thus, country 1’s authorities need to intervene to avoid this 
situation.  
In the following we consider a scenario where country 1 uses monetary policy to 
target its domestic inflation and fiscal policy to manage its current account, while country 
2 merely uses monetary policy to target its domestic inflation and let the exchange rate 
float.  
We show in Appendix A.6 that under this situation, the impact of the productivity 
shock in country 2’s tradable sector on country 1’s terms of trade would be   29
m d dCA dTOT 2 7 6 α Φ + Φ − = . (30) 
Recall that equation (24) measures how country 1’s current account would have changed 
by the productivity shock in the no-manipulation benchmark scenario. Thus, substituting 
it into equation (30), we obtain the benchmark impact of the productivity hike on the 
terms of trade:   
m
BM d dTOT 2 7 6 2 ) ( α Φ + Φ Φ = . (31) 
On the other hand, when country 1 manages to avoid current account imbalance by 
keeping  0 = dCA , the impact of the productivity shock on the terms of trade would be   
m
CA d dTOT 2 7 α Φ =  (32). 
A comparison between equations (31) and (32) indicates that   
CA BM dTOT dTOT >  (33) 
which implies that country 2 would gain less trade advantage from its productivity hike if 
country 1 managed to avoid the current account imbalance caused by the increased 
productivity. Less competitive advantage for country 2 means relatively more 
competitive advantage for country 1. Therefore,   
 
Remark 3.7 Currency account “manipulation” that fixes or prevents current account 
imbalance can gain a country extra trade advantage.   
 
Currency manipulation versus current account manipulation 
Combining inequalities (29) and (33), we obtain   30
CA BM EX dTOT dTOT dTOT > > , (34) 
which implies that while country 2 can gain extra competitive advantage in international 
trade from pegging its currency, country 1 can also gain extra trade advantage through 
targeting its current account balance. The question is whether such extra advantages are 
“unfair”. 
It is inconceivable that a country would try to enhance its export competitiveness by 
pegging its currency. Indeed, currency peg is a macroeconomic policy for creating a more 
stable market mechanism to improve microeconomic efficiency. While a country’s 
currency peg may gain it extra trade advantage through the wealth effect, it is not the 
result of its interference with trade flows or price adjustments in international trade but 
the consequence of higher inflation. Thus, we do not see any a priori reason to deem such 
extra trade advantage unfair.   
Current account management is also a macroeconomic policy for preventing 
potential economic instability in the future; and we are aware of no country claiming that 
it intentionally uses current account policy to enhance its competitiveness in international 
trade. However, while the legitimacy of preventing or fixing current account imbalance is 
often taken for granted, its implications to international trade are seldom discussed. 
Indeed, forbidding current account imbalance is to guarantee that a country’s tradable 
sector (as a whole) will not lose its world market share from international competition 
because for every bit of domestic market yielded, “no imbalance” implies that there will 
be an equal amount of gain in the foreign market. Therefore, in the sense that current   31
account management represents interference with international trade (notwithstanding for 
a legitimate cause), any extra competitiveness a country gains from targeting its current 
account would reflect unfair trade advantage. Ironically, under the no-imbalance rule, this 
country’s trade partners would be obliged to adjust their currencies to accommodate the 
current account “manipulation” that unfairly impair their trade advantage or otherwise be 
guilty of currency “manipulation”.   
In sum, 
 
Remark 3.8 A country’s currency peg does not provide it with unfair trade advantage. 
Rather, a country can gain unfair trade advantage through preventing or fixing current 
account imbalance. Therefore, as far as causing unfair trade advantage is concerned, 
currency peg is less a manipulation than the attempt to prevent or fix current account 
imbalance.  
 
4.  Discussion  
John Maynard Keynes’ conviction that “the power of vested interests is vastly 
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas” still stands;
17 currency 
manipulation would not have become such a prevalent and forceful charge had the 
                                                        
17  In concluding his General Theory, Keynes shared his following insights: ”Practical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in 
authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am 
sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.”   
   32
plaintiffs not genuinely believed that currency peg unfairly impairs their interests. Yet the 
question is the encroachment of what ideas is responsible for such a widespread fallacy 
regarding currency manipulation.   
Dogmatically endorsing the free-market doctrine is the number one factor behind the 
false accusation of currency manipulation. Currency peg is a natural suspect of 
manipulation because it entails government “intervention” in the foreign exchange 
market. Those against currency “manipulation” often believe that they are on a moral 
high ground defending the sacrosanct free market mechanism. Yet they actually miss the 
point that a purely market-based and government-free exchange rate does not exist. As 
the ultimate supplier of money, government has to be part of the mechanism determining 
the exchange rate, directly or indirectly. 
Persistent balance of payments surplus or large foreign reserves accumulation is 
often viewed as evidence of currency manipulation because they manifest government’s 
presence in the foreign exchange market. However, compared to the Chinese government 
holding a large amount of treasury securities by itself, what would be the difference had it 
given money to its citizens and allowed them to purchase the U.S. treasury securities 
instead? According to the rule of no protracted intervention, the United States would have 
been guilty of currency manipulation had the Federal Reserves conducted its open market 
operations in the foreign exchange market during its monetary expansion in the early 
2000s. However, what is effectively different as it actually injected the cheap money 
through the treasury markets?     33
The free-market doctrine is still valid; the key is to respect government’s “freedom” 
in choosing monetary policy instruments. Blessed with its mature financial system, 
sophisticated central banking institutions, and special status in the international financial 
system, the United States does not have to use the exchange rate as a monetary policy 
instrument. However, this should not prohibit other countries from using it.   
Misunderstanding the concept of exchange rate misalignment is another factor 
behind the false accusation of currency manipulation. Economics theory declares that a 
country with persistent current account surpluses has an undervalued currency. This 
seems to automatically convict a surplus country guilty of currency manipulation by 
pegging its currency. After all, why is a country artificially keeping its currency 
undervalued not manipulating it? The answer is actually straightforward, as long as one 
correctly understands the concept of exchange rate misalignment. In short, currency peg 
is not manipulation even when it keeps the currency misaligned because currency peg 
does not cause the misalignment; current account imbalance does. A fixed exchange rate 
can never trigger current account imbalance. Yet when current account imbalance occurs 
for other reasons such as tax cuts, government expenditure expansion, or both, the fixed 
exchange rate would become misaligned by definition. A natural way to correct such 
misalignments is to fix the current account imbalance by counteracting its original causes. 
A wishful thinking is the other way around, i.e., to fix current account imbalance by 
correcting exchange rate misalignments. However, as discussed above, exchange rate is 
not an effective instrument for fixing current account imbalance.   34
Misunderstanding the concept of exchange rate misalignment is also responsible for 
the misperception that currency peg would prevent effective current account adjustments. 
Indeed, our analysis has shown that flexible exchange rate is not a necessary condition 
for current account adjustments. Economics theory declares that exchange rate is 
misaligned when current account is imbalanced, yet that means the misalignment of the 
real exchange rate, which is determined jointly by the domestic price level of the surplus 
country, that of the deficit country, and the nominal exchange rate between their 
currencies. Thus, currency peg per se, which fixes only the nominal exchange rate, is not 
able to prevent correction of real exchange rate misalignment. Even when a surplus 
country pegs its currency and targets its inflation rate simultaneously, its trade partner can 
still fix its current account imbalance by sacrificing its own inflation target. It is true that 
the deficit country may find this solution difficult because of its wage or other domestic 
nominal rigidities. However, it is not reasonable for it to blame its own current account 
imbalance on a nominal rigidity (i.e., currency peg) in another country while taking for 
granted its own rigidities that are no less guilty.   
At the end of the day, those who blame currency peg for current account imbalance 
should ponder upon the following question: If flexible exchange rate is really a necessary 
condition for current account adjustments, why current account imbalance can occur 
under a fixed exchange rate in the first place?   
The most ironic fallacy in the RMB controversies is the claim that currency peg 
gives a surplus country unfair trade advantage by keeping its currency undervalued. A   35
country can indeed gain more trade advantage from a productivity hike in its tradable 
sector under a fixed exchange rate than under a flexible one. However, such extra 
advantage is due to a wealth effect and not a priori unfair. On the contrary, obliging a 
country to adjust its exchange rate to help fix its trade partners’ current account 
imbalance is to ask it to accommodate their trade intervention that would unfairly impair 
its competitive advantage. Correcting current account imbalance may be necessary from 
macroeconomic stability. However, a microeconomic implication of the no-imbalance 
rule is to protect a country’s overall trade performance from international competition. 
IMF has recently been criticized for being “asleep at the wheel” on “its most 
fundamental responsibility” (i.e., exchange rate surveillance) so as to let global imbalance 
(i.e., the U.S. current account deficits) out of control (Adams, 2005; Goldstein and Mussa, 
2005). While our analysis supports the IMF’s cautiousness in joining the 
anti-currency-manipulation movement, a more fundamental question is whether the 
attention on external imbalance has been misguided.       
A major concern over the persistent and large current account deficit in the U.S. is 
that its reversal could jeopardize not only its own economic stability but also that of the 
entire world. It is a widespread concern that such reversals could be triggered by foreign 
investors switching from USD-denominated assets to other assets (Blanchard et al., 2005; 
Edwards, 2005). However, the practical relevance of such reversals can be significantly 
reduced by the presence of governments in the foreign exchange markets. As long as 
monetary authorities in major nations prioritize their responsibility for maintaining global   36
financial stability over the profitability of their foreign reserve portfolios, they are well 
capable of neutralizing any shock caused by portfolio adjustments in the private sector. 
Indeed, such shocks may not occur in the first place when well-functioned international 
monetary coordination helps establish the private sector’s confidence in global financial 
stability.  
A large amount of U.S. treasury securities being held by foreigners is not a threat to 
global economic stability.
18 The real threat is the massive U.S. public debts that may 
have to be inflated away. The right way for the U.S. to address this issue is to defuse its 
ticking “debt bomb” through increasing public and/or private savings. Its current account 
imbalance is merely a superficial symptom of the more fundamental debt problem; and 
trying to fix the imbalance through dollar depreciation will not solve the problem but 
could cause unnecessary economic instability.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
While much effort has been spent in saving the Bretton Woods system to no avail in the 
early 1970s, several Asian countries have been accused of currency manipulation for 
trying to maintain a “revived Bretton Woods system” (Dooley et al., 2003) in the early 
2000s. While the IMF was originally established to maintain exchange rate stability so as 
to prevent competitive depreciation, it has recently been criticized for allowing exchange 
                                                        
18 In the era of globalization, U.S. investors are not necessarily more loyal to dollar-denominated assets than foreign 
investors. Indeed, foreign government holders could be less likely than U.S. investors to run against the U.S. assets 
since they are more concerned about financial and economic stability than profitability.     37
rate stability to prevent exchange rate depreciation. More ironically, winning the battle 
against currency manipulation will not fix the U.S. current account imbalance; yet if the 
United States goes directly to tackle the root problem that its excessive external 
imbalance reflects, the battle would not be necessary.   
To summarize, currency peg is not currency manipulation. As long as the U.S. 
maintains its good performance in inflation control, many countries will continue to find 
it attractive to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar. As for China, before a sound 
financial system is established, currency peg will still be a convenient way to outsource 
financial services.   
Current account or balance of payments should no longer be treated the way it was 
when money supply depended on the supply of gold or other real species. With its foreign 
debts denominated in its own currency, the United States especially has no reason to 
worry about balance of payments crises. If the United States believes that its excessive 
current account imbalance reflects that its future macroeconomic stability is in jeopardy, 
it should cure the disease but not attack the symptom. 
In the era of globalization, international policy coordination is unavoidable. However, 
such coordination can only be successful through cooperation; and false accusation based 
on bad economics would be counterproductive. 
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A.1 The model 
Country 1’s production of its tradable goods:   
x x x L Q 1 1 1 α = ,    (A.1) 
x x x Q P L W 1 1 1 1 = ,   (A.2) 
Country 1’s production of its non-tradable goods:   
n n n L Q 1 1 1 α = , (A.3) 
n n n Q P L W 1 1 1 1 = ,   (A.4) 
Country 2’s production of its tradable goods:   
m m m L Q 2 2 2 α = , (A.5) 
m m m Q P L W 2 2 2 2 = ,   (A.6)   40
Country 2’s production of its non-tradable good:   
n n n L Q 2 2 2 α = , (A.7) 
n n n Q P L W 2 2 2 2 = ,   (A.8) 
Country 1’s consumption of goods  x Q1 ,  m Q2 , and  n Q1 :  
) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1
+ −
= s i Y C P x x x θ ,   (A.9) 
) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1
+ −
= s i Y C P m m m θ ,   (A.10) 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
+ − + −
− − = = s i Y s i Y C P m x n n n θ θ θ ,   (A.11) 
Country 2’s consumption of goods  x Q1 ,  m Q2 , and  n Q2 : 
) , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2
+ −
= s i Y C P x x x θ ,   (A.12) 
) , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2
+ −
= s i Y C P m m m θ ,   (A.13) 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
+ − + −
− − = = s i Y s i Y C P m x n n n θ θ θ ,   (A.14) 
Goods market clearing conditions: 
n n Q C 1 1 =    (A.15) 
x x x Q C C 1 2 1 = +    (A.16) 
n n Q C 2 2 =    (A.17) 
m m m Q C C 2 2 1 = +    (A.18) 
x x eP P 1 2 =    (A.19) 
m m eP P 1 2 =    (A.20) 
Labor market clearing conditions: 
1 1 1 L L L n x = +    (A.21)   41
2 2 2 L L L n m = +    (A.22) 
Uncovered interest parity: 
2 1 1 ) / 1 )( 1 ( i e e i + = + + &    (A.23) 
Definitions of inflations and current account:   
1 ) )( (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − + + + + ≡
−
n n m m x x n n m m x x C P C P C P C P C P C P π  (A.24) 
1 ) )( (
1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 − + + + + ≡
−
n n m m x x n n m m x x C P C P C P C P C P C P π  (A.25) 
m m x x C P C P CA 1 1 2 1 − ≡ .   (A.26) 
Endogenous variables:   
Country 1:  x C1 ,  m C1 ,  n C1 ,  x Q1 ,  n Q1 ,  x L1 ,  n L1 ,  x P 1 ,  m P 1 ,  n P 1 ,  1 W   
Country 2:  x C2 ,  m C2 ,  n C2 ,  m Q2 ,  n Q2 ,  m L2 ,  n L2 ,  x P 2 ,  m P 2 , n P 2 ,  2 W  
Policy targets: 
 Internal  balance:  1 π ,  2 π  
 External  balance:  CA, e 
Policy instruments: 
 Monetary  policy:  1 i , 2 i  
 Fiscal  policy:  1 s , 2 s   
 
A.2 Simplifying the model 
Substituting equation (A.1) into (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.4) then combining the two results, 
we obtain     42
n n x x P P 1 1 1 1 α α = ,   (A.27) 












2 2 2 2
1




+ − + −
 (A.28) 
Substituting equation (A.15) into (A.3), then substituting the result into (A.11), then 







1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1






=  (A.29) 
Combining equations (A.28) and (A.29), we obtain 
) (
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , (
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 2 2 2
1

















+ − + − + −
α
α
θ θ α θ θ
 (A.30) 
Substituting equations (A.19), (A.21) and (A.27) into (A.30) and rearranging, we obtain 
the first equation in the simplifying model: 























=  (16)   
Symmetrically, we can derive the second equation in the simplifying model: 
) , (
1




















+ =  (17)   
Combining (A.9) – (A.11), substituting in (A.24), then rearranging, we obtain 
() ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 n n m m x x C P C P C P Y + + + = π  (A.31) 
























1 1 1 1 1 1
θ θ
θ π  (A.31) 
























1 1 1 1 1 1
θ θ
θ π  (A.32) 























1 1 1 1 1 1 1
α
θ α
θ θ π  (18) 






















2 2 2 2 2 2 1
α
θ α
θ θ π  (19)   
The fifth equation in the simplifying model is identical equation (A.23): 
2 1 1 ) / 1 )( 1 ( i e e i + = + + &  (20)   




1 1 1 1






− =    (21)  
 
A.3 Flexible exchange rate 
Under flexible exchange rate,  x P 1 ,  m P 2 ,  1 i ,  2 i , CA, and e are endogenous variables in 
the 6-equantion simplifying model. We will examine how a demand shock in country 1 
( 1 ds ) or a productivity shock in country 2 ( m d 2 α ) affects these endogenous variables.   
Before we proceed, note that countries 1 and 2’s interest rates are equal at 
equilibrium; and we will use i to denote the world interest rate in the following analysis 
for simplicity.   44
Solving equation (16) and (17) simultaneously, we obtain 
() () ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
2
2 1 1 1 s i Y L
eP
P
L P m x x m
x
m






− −    (A.33) 
and 
() () ) , ( 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
2
1
2 2 1 2 s i Y L
P
eP
L P m x m x
m
x






− −    (A.34) 
Total differentiating (A.33) and (A.34), we obtain   
() () 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2
1
2 1 1 1 1 ds Y di Y
P
eP
d dP s m x i m x
m
x






+  (A.33') 
() ( ) m m m i m x
m
x
m d L P di Y
P
eP
d dP 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2
1






−  (A.34') 
where 
() 0 1 2 2 2
1
2












L θ α θ α ω    (A.35) 

























P θ α ω  (A.36) 
() 0 1 1 1 1
2
1












L θ α α θ ω  (A.37) 
0 1 1 1 2 4 > ≡ m x m L P θ α ω  (A.38) 
Assume that   
1 1 2 < + m x θ θ ;   (A.39) 
i.e., the proportion of imports in total consumption is small in both countries, which is not 
unrealistic. 
According to equation (A.33), (A.34) and (39), it is not difficult to verify inequalities   45
(A.35) and (A.37) respectively. Inequalities (A.36) and (A.38) are obvious.   





























































2 2 2 2 1 α
α
θ α
θ π  (19') 
Substituting equations (18’) and (19’) into (A.33’) and (A.34’) respectively, we obtain 
() [] () () 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2
1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ds Y di Y
P
eP
d P s m x i m x
m
x






+ +  (A.40) 
and 
()
() () () m m m
m
n n













2 2 1 2 2
2
2 2













π ω θ θ






























Solving equations (A.40) and (A.41) together, we obtain 
()
1
7 2 6 1 5
2











d  (A.42) 
where 
() 0 1 2 1 1 2 5 > − − − ≡ i s m x Y Y θ θ ω  (A.43) 
()( ) 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 2
2
2 2






− − + ≡ i m m
m
n n
n Y L P P θ π ω
α
θ α
ω  (A.44) 




























+ − ≡ i m m i
x
m
x x Y P Y
eP
P
P ω θ π ω ω θ π ω ω    (A.45)   46
Since 0 1 > s Y , 0 2 < i Y , and  1 1 2 < + m x θ θ  according to inequality (39), it is not difficult 
to verify inequality (A.43).   
Substituting equation (19) into (A.44), we obtain 
() () i m m m
x
m





P P P 1 2 1 2 2
1
2
















+ + − ≡ θ α θ θ π ω ω
α
ω ,  




















+ + + − ≡ i
x
m





P P L eP θ θ π ω θ α
α
ω , (A.44’) 
Since 0 1 < i Y  and  0 3 > ω  according to inequality (A.37), it is not difficult to verify 
inequality (A.44’) or equivalently (A.44).   
Since 0 1 < i Y , 0 2 < i Y , and  0 > i ω  ( i = 1, 2, 3, 4) according to inequalities (A.35) – 
(A.38), it is not difficult to verify inequality (A.45).     
 
A.3.1 Impact of country 2’s tradable productivity shock on country 1’s terms of trade 
According to inequality (A.42), the impact of the productivity shock  m d 2 α  on country 










1 α ω ω









BM d dTOT 2 1 α Φ =  (A.46') 
where  0 6
1
7 1 > = Φ
− ω ω . This inequality implies that under flexible exchange rate, a 
positive productivity shock in country 2’s tradable sector tends to increase country 1’s   47
terms of trade. 
 
A.3.2 Impact of country 1’s demand shock on its interest rate and current account 
Let 0 2 = m dα and solve equations (A.40) and (A.41) together; we obtain   
() ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 1 1 2 9 2 1 2 8 1 1 2 9 1 1 1 ds Y di Y Y s m x i m x i m x θ θ ω θ θ ω θ θ ω − − − = − − + − −  (A.47) 
where 
() [] 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 8 > + + ≡ ω θ π ω ω m m P  (A.48) 
























P  (A.49) 
Since 0 > i ω  ( i = 1, 2, 3, 4) according to inequalities (A.35) – (A.38), it is not difficult 
to verify inequalities (A.48) and (A.49). Then, since  0 1 > s Y , 0 1 < i Y  and  0 2 < i Y , 
according to equation (A.47),   
() () () [ ] 0 1 1 1
1
2 1 2 8 1 1 2 9 1 1 2 9
1
> − − + − − − − − =
−
i m x i m x s m x Y Y Y
ds
di
θ θ ω θ θ ω θ θ ω , (A.50) 
which implies that under flexible exchange rate, a positive demand shock in country 1 
tends to increase the world interest rate.   

























=  (A.51) 






























































+ =  (A.52) 






d dCA 2 11
2
1






− = , (A.53) 
where  






1 2 1 1 1
1


























x m x eP
P
L P θ θ ω . (A.55) 
Note  0 ≤ CA   since we consider a situation where country 1 has current account deficits. 
Then, according to inequality (A.39), it is not difficult to verify inequalities (A.54) and 
(A.55).  
  Substituting equation (A.42) into (A.53), we obtain 
( ) m d ds dCA 2 11 6
1
7 10 1 5
1
7 10 α ω ω ω ω ω ω ω − − − =
− − , (A.56) 










which implies that under flexible exchange rate, a positive demand shock in country 1 
will enlarge its current account deficit.   
 
A.3.3 Impact of country 2’s productivity shock on country 1’s current account   
According to equation (A.56), the impact of a productivity shock in country 2’s tradable   49
sector on country 1’s current account can be measured by 
m d dCA 2 2 α Φ − = , (A.58) 
where  ( ) 11 7 6 10
1
7 2 ω ω ω ω ω − ≡ Φ
−  has an ambiguous sign. According to equations (A.36), 
(A.37), (A.38), (A.44'), (A.45), (A.54), and (A.55), 
15 14 13 12 2 ω ω ω ω − − + ≡ Φ , 
where, supposing  0 ≤ CA , 
() () 0 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1
2 2 2

































ω  (A.59) 

















x m x m m Y
eP
P
L P P θ θ θ π ω ω  (A.60) 










x m x m m Y
eP
P
L P P θ θ θ π ω ω  (A.61) 










x m x Y
eP
P
L P θ θ ω ω . (A.62) 
According to equations (A.59), the larger country 1’s current account deficit is, the more 
likely that the productivity hike in country 2 would further aggravate the deficit. 
According equations (A.59) and (A.60), the smoother is country 1’s monetary 
transmission, which in the model here is measured by the sensitivity of its aggregate 
demand to a change in the interest rate (i.e., i Y1 ), the more likely that the productivity hike 
in country 2 would negatively affect its current account. Conversely according to 
equation (A.61) – (A.62), the less smooth is country 2’s monetary transmission 
(measured by  i Y2 ), the more likely that country 2’s productivity hike would have a 
negative impact on country 1’s  current  account.      50
A.3.4 Impact of country 2’s productivity shock on the exchange rate 


























































































π θ  (19'') 
Solving these two equations together, we obtain 





























1 1 1 2 2
2 2
2 2 2


























which, substituting in equation (18'), becomes 
m d de 2 3 α Φ − =  (A.63) 
where  
17 16 3 ω ω − = Φ  (A.64) 
() 0 1 2
2 2
2 2 2
























































θ π θ π
ω ω ω . (A.66) 
The sign of  17 ω  is undetermined yet most likely positive since the sum of its last two 
terms, which represent the proportion of imported goods in total consumption for 
countries 1 and 2 respectively, is not likely to be greater than unity. Thus, the sign of  1 Φ  
is ambiguous, which implies that similar to the case of current account, the impact of 
country 2’s productivity hike in the tradable sector on the exchange rate is ambiguous.     
   51
A.3.5 Impact of country 1’s demand shock on the exchange rate 


















which, according to equations (A.43) and (A.45), indicates that country 1’s demand shock 
has a positive impact on its terms of trade.   
Letting 0 2 = m dα   and solving equations (18'') and (19'') simultaneously, we obtain 








































π θ π , 
which, substituting in equations (18'), becomes 








































2 1 1 1 θ π
θ
π , 
which, substituting in equation (A.42'), becomes 

































+ − + − =  (A.67) 
As just mentioned, the term in the bracket on the right hand side of equation (A.67) tends 








which implies that under flexible exchange rate, a positive demand shock in country 1 
can appreciate its currency, while fiscal tightening tends to depreciate it.     52
A.4 Currency peg 
A.4.1 Impact of fiscal tightening under currency peg without inflation target 
When country 2 sacrifices its inflation targeting for currency peg,  x P 1 ,  m P 2 ,  1 i ,  2 i , CA, 
and  2 π  are endogenous variables in the 6-equantion simplifying model; and the 
exchange rate e becomes exogenous.   
  Modifying equation (16), we obtain 




























= ,  
which, after total differentiation, we obtain 

























































































































































































θ θ π , (18''') 





































21 ω  (A.71), 
where  
() 0 1 1 1 1
2
21 >  

 




θ π ω  
The signs of  18 ω ,  19 ω , and  20 ω   are obvious, while that of  21 ω   would be not difficult 
to verify according to equation (18) 
  Solving equations (A.69) – (A.71) simultaneously, we obtain 





x d ds de
P
eP











































































2 2 1 1 2
1 1 1
























ω ω ω . 
According to inequality (A.39), the signs of  23 ω  and  24 ω   are easily verified, while the 
signs of  22 ω  and  25 ω  are  obvious.   54














,   (A.73) 
which, according to equation (A.71), gives 
1 26 2 ds dP m ω − = , (A.74) 
where  
0 24 22 21
1
2



































=  (A.51') 
































1 1 1 2 2
2 1 θ θ
θ α
 (A.75) 










































2 2 1 θ π , 



























































θ π ω  
Since we consider the situation where country 1 has current account imbalance (i.e.,   55
0 ≤ CA ), the sign of  27 ω  is  obvious.  
  Substituting equation (A.73) into (A.76), we obtain 
1 24 22 27 ds dCA ω ω ω − = , (A.77) 







which indicates that country 1’s fiscal tightening (i.e. 0 1 < ds ) is still able to fix current 
account imbalance when country 2 pegs its currency but does not target its inflation.   



































1 1 θ π π
π     
which, substituting equations (A.73) and (A.74), gives 

































Inequality (A.78) implies that when country 1 uses fiscal tightening to fix its current 
account imbalance, country 2’s currency peg would cause its own higher inflation.   
 
A.4.2 Impacts of fiscal tightening under currency peg plus inflation target 
Suppose country 1 uses monetary policy and fiscal policy to target both its domestic 
inflation and current account, while country 2 uses them to target both its inflation and   56
exchange rate. Under this situation, according to equation (18) and (19), the fixed 
exchange rate implies that both  x P 1  and  m P 2  need to be fixed too in order to let both 
countries achieve their inflation targets. According to equation (16) and (17), fixed  x P 1  
and  m P 2  requires both fixed  1 Y  and  2 Y , which, according to equation (21), requires 
fixed CA. In sum, when both countries target their inflations, currency peg will anchor 
current account; and country 1’s fiscal tightening would not be able to fix its current 
account imbalance. 
Suppose country 2 uses both monetary policy and fiscal policy to target both its 
inflation and exchange rate, while country 1 sacrifices its inflation targeting in order to 
improve its current account. Under this situation, we will show that country 1 can use the 
interest rate as an instrument to improve it current account.   
Modifying equation (19) into 
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n m m P P e
α
θ α
θ π ω    (A.79') 
Substituting equation (A.79) into (A.33'), we obtain 
di dPx 30 1 ω − = , (A.80)   57
where  
[] () 0 1 1 1 2
1
29 2 1 30 > − − + − ≡
−
i m x Y θ θ ω ω ω ω  
Substituting equations (A.79) and (A.80) into (A.52), we obtain 





































ω ω α ω
ω  
Equations (A.81) implies that even when country 2 targets both its inflation rate and 
exchange rate, country 1 can still fix its current account imbalance through increasing its 
own interest rate.   

































π ,  
which, substituting in equations (A.79), A(79'), and (A.80) , gives 
di d 32 1 ω π − = , (A.82) 
where  
() () () 30 1 1 1
2
2 2
































The first term in the bracket on the right hand side of equation (A.82') gauges the 
proportion of country 2’s domestic consumption in its total consumption, while the 
second term gauges the proportion of country 1’s import consumption in its total 
consumption. Since the former tends to be greater than the latter, under a normal situation,   58
the sign of  32 ω  would be positive (i.e., ) 0 32 > ω , which, according to equation (A.82), 
implies that by sacrificing its inflation targeting for fixing its current account imbalance, 
country 1 has to bear with below-target inflation.   
 
A.5 Currency manipulation   
According to equation (A.72) 
de d dTOT m 5 2 4 Φ + Φ = α  (A.83) 
where  25 22 4 ω ω ≡ Φ  and  23 22 5 ω ω ≡ Φ . Since  0 5 > Φ , country 2’s currency peg will 
provide it with extra trade advantage by keeping its currency from appreciating (i.e., 
0 < de ). 
 
A.6 Current account manipulation 






d 2 7 6
2










− ≡ Φ ω  and  11
1
10 7 ω ω
− ≡ Φ . Since  0 6 > Φ , equation (A.84) implies that country 
1 can gain extra trade advantage from preventing or fixing its current account imbalance. 
 